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Investigation of Target Capital Structure for 
Electronic Listed Firms in Taiwan
Chien-Chung Nieh, Hwey-Yun Yau, and Wen-Chien Liu
AbsTrAcT: This paper investigates the existence of an optimal debt ratio for the electronic 
listed firms in Taiwan, using balanced panel data for a sample of 143 selected electronics 
companies listed in the Taiwan Stock Exchange (TSE) from the first quarter of 1999 to 
the third quarter of 2004. The result shows that there is a single threshold effect of debt 
ratio on firm value when return on equity (ROE) is used to proxy firm value. Furthermore, 
based on our combined findings of ROE and earnings per share (EPS) triple threshold 
estimations, we find that the appropriate debt ratio range for the electronic listed firms in 
Taiwan should not be over 51.57 percent or below 12.37 percent. To ensure and enhance 
the firm’s value, the optimal range of debt ratio should be within 12.37 percent and 28.70 
percent. The implications of the findings for financial managers and shareholders’ welfare 
are discussed.
KEy words: capital structure, debt-to-assets ratio, firm value, panel threshold effect.
A financial manager in a corporation is responsible for establishing financial policy and 
planning to maximize firm value and stockholders’ welfare. One important element is 
deciding how much leverage should be applied. Generally, a higher debt ratio can enhance 
the rate of return on equity capital. However, a higher debt ratio also increases the risk 
of the firm’s earning. Therefore, a capital structure decision involves trade-offs between 
risk and capital return. This paper aims to find an optimal debt ratio (debt to total assets, 
D/TA) for the capital investment and investigating effects of financial leverage on a firm’s 
performance or firm value for the electronic listed firms in Taiwan.
In the past several decades, the effect of a firm’s capital structure on policy has been 
important in the field of corporate finance. Modigliani and Miller (1958; 1963) first 
discussed the relation between firm value and capital structure. Traditionally, there have 
been two main conflicting theories. The trade-off theory mainly describes the benefit and 
cost of debt, such as the benefit of tax deductibility of interest (Modigliani and Miller 
1963), agency costs of debt and equity (Harris and Raviv 1990; Jensen 1986; Jensen and 
Meckling 1976; Myers 1977; Stulz 1990), and asymmetric information (Leland and Pyle 
1977; Ross 1977). The pecking-order theory (Chirinko and Singha 2000; Frank and Goyal 
2003; Myers 1984; Myers and Majluf 1984; Shyam-Sunder and Myers 1999) states that 
managers do not pursue a particular capital structure due to the presence of asymmetric 
information between better-informed managers and less-informed investors. Therefore, 
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firms gather capital first through internally retained earning, then through low-risk debt. 
Equity is the last resort, under duress.
Recently, in addition to the traditional trade-off and pecking-order theory mentioned 
above, there have been some newly developed points of view about the decisions of 
capital structure. Baker and Wurgler (2002) illustrate the effect of equity issuance tim-
ing on capital structure. Other examples that also refer to the patterns of market timing 
theory include Alti (2006), Graham et al. (1999), Hovakimian (2006), Huang and Ritter 
(2007), Jenter (2005), Kim and Wu (1988), and Kisgen (2006). In addition, Welch (2004) 
finds that equity price shocks have a long-lasting effect on corporate capital structures 
and stock returns are the primary determinant of capital structure changes. Both of these 
two points of view are inconsistent with the trade-off theory, which pursues a particular 
optimal capital structure. However, other studies provide direct evidence that firms indeed 
have optimal capital structures and adjust toward them—consistent with trade-off theory 
(Fama and French 2002; Flannery and Rangan 2006; Jalilvand and Harris 1984; Marsh 
1982; Taggart 1977).
Taiwan, a typical island and export-oriented country, is one of the major suppliers of 
electronics and information technology (IT) products to the United States and the rest of 
the world. Taiwan’s economy now relies more on capital-intensive goods than ever. Whit-
ing (1991) has pointed out that its weighted average debt as a percentage of total capital 
within the electronics industry is higher than within other types of industry.1 Therefore, 
it is worth exploring the effect of financial leverage on firm value for listed electronic 
companies in Taiwan. This paper applies a threshold regression model to the observed 
balanced panel data to study the effect of the D/TA ratio on firm value, the threshold 
effect, and any asymmetrical response, if it exists.
This paper contributes to the previous literature in four aspects. First, we apply the 
advanced panel threshold regression model developed by Hansen (1999) to test if there 
exists a threshold of optimal debt usage. In contrast to the traditional linear model, this 
nonlinear threshold model can describe the trade-off between the benefits of tax shelters 
that come from more debt and the disadvantages of costs from additional debts that may 
negatively affect corporate performance or value. Second, we closely examine the finan-
cial characteristics of the electronic listed companies to solve the short period sample 
problems. Third, we use both accounting measurements of ROE and EPS to proxy firm 
value. Finally, two related control variables are considered and added to the regression 
analysis to make our nonlinear model more realistic.
Methodological Issues
Hansen’s (1999) panel threshold regression model is an extension of the traditional least-
squared estimation method. It requires that the variables in the model be stationary to 
avoid a “spurious regression.”2 We thus employ a unit-root test in our first step. Because 
the data sets are all panels in our investigation, both well-known LLC (Levin et al. 2002) 
and IPS (Im et al. 2003) techniques are employed for our panel unit-root tests.3
Assuming that the optimal debt proportion appears to be relevant to corporate perfor-
mance or the value of listed electronic firms in Taiwan, this paper aims to find if there 
is a threshold effect and tries to use a threshold regression model to estimate the ratio 
appropriately. This may capture the relation between financial leverage and firm value 
as well as help financial managers make decisions. As a second step, we introduce the 
procedure briefly, as follows.4
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According to Hansen (1999), we set up the panel threshold regression model with 
fixed effects, as follows:
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(1)
 q = (q1, q2)′, hit = (sit, git)′.
where vit represents proxy variables for the firm value. These variables are eit (ROE) and 
pit (EPS). The value dit, the D/TA ratio, is the threshold variable; γ represents the specific 
estimated threshold value. Two control variables, sit (growth rate of operating sales) and 
git (growth rate of total assets), are also incorporated into our model for their possible 
influences upon firm value. Besides, µi, the fixed effect, represents the heterogeneity of 
companies under different operating conditions. The error term, εit, is assumed to be inde-
pendent and identically distributed with mean zero and finite variance σ2(εit ~ iid(0, σ2)). 
The values i and t denote different companies and periods, respectively.
In estimations, we first eliminate the individual effect µi using within-transformation 
estimation techniques in the traditional fixed-effect model of panel data. By using or-
dinary least squares and minimizing the concentrated sum of squares of errors, S1(γ), 
we can obtain the estimators of our threshold value and the residual variance, γ[ and σ[2, 
respectively.
For the testing procedures, we first examine the null hypothesis of no threshold effect, 
H0: α1 = α2, which can be based on the likelihood ratio test: F1 = (S0 – S1(γ[)/σ[2, where S0 
and S1(γ[) are sums of squared errors under null and alternative hypotheses, respectively. 
However, as the asymptotic distribution of F1 is nonstandard, we use the bootstrap pro-
cedure to construct the critical values and p-value.
Upon the existence of a threshold effect, H0: α1 ≠ α2, we test for the asymptotic dis-
tribution of threshold estimate, H0: γ = γ0, and adopt the likelihood ratio test, LR1(γ) = 
(S1(γ) – S1(γ[)/σ[2, with the asymptotic confidence intervals as follows:5
 
c α α( ) = − − −( )2 1 1log .
Furthermore, if a single threshold indeed exists, we can extend the panel threshold 
regression model with single threshold to the double as follows:
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(2)
where threshold value γ1 < γ2.
Following the same procedure, we can go further to triple or multiple thresholds: (γ1, 
γ2, γ3, …, γn).
Data and Empirical Results
Data Description
We use balanced panel data for a sample of 143 selected electronics companies listed 
on the TSE from the first quarter of 1999 to the third quarter of 2004. A total of 3,289 
observations are adopted for each variable considered.
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For the firm value, we choose the accounting measurements EPS and ROE, which are 
commonly used to indicate or proxy variables to evaluate firm performance or value. There 
are two categories of explanatory variables in our panel data examination. The first is the 
threshold variable, which is the key variable used to find out if there is an asymmetric 
threshold effect of financial leverage on firm value. The D/TA ratio indicates the debt 
ratio of the firms; it is widely used in the literature. The second category of explanatory 
variable is the control variable, which we adopt to make our nonlinear function form 
more persuasive. Most listed electronics companies in Taiwan are highly profitable, with 
high growth prospects. Therefore, we have included two control variables in our analysis: 
the growth rates of operating sales and total assets. These two variables are presumed to 
influence firm value. All data sets are obtained from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) 
Data Bank of Taiwan. Table 1 shows descriptive statistics of the variables.
Results of Panel Unit-Root and Threshold Regression
The results of the stationary test for each panel—explained variables, threshold variables, 
and control variables—are shown in Table 2. All of the variables are presumed to carry 
stationary characteristics—that is, the type I(0) series, as the null hypotheses of unit root 
are all rejected in the findings from both the LLC and IPS tests. These stationary findings 
enable us to estimate the panel threshold regression further.
We employ the panel threshold model elaborated by Hansen (1999) to test for single-, 
double-, and triple-threshold effects, respectively, of the debt ratio on firm value. Table 3 
shows that the test for a single threshold is significant at the 10 percent level only when 
ROE is adopted to proxy firm value. Moreover, when testing for double- and triple-
threshold effects, no matter which proxy variable, ROE or EPS, is used for firm value, 
the threshold effects are insignificant. We thus conclude that there only exists a single 
threshold effect of debt ratio on firm value when ROE is selected to proxy firm value. 
The estimated threshold value (γ) is found to be 75.31 percent; it separates all of the 
observations into two regimes. Table 4 illustrates that the coefficients of both regimes 
are negative: α[1 = –0.0193 and α[2 = –0.0817, though only α[2 of the upper regime is 
significant at the 1 percent level.
Although the test for a triple-threshold effect is insignificant, we can find some im-
portant evidence to help us make capital structure decisions. The empirical results of the 
regression slope estimates and White-corrected standard errors for the triple threshold 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for each variable
  Standard
Variables Mean deviation Maximum Minimum
eit 1.69 6.96 30.86 –139.72
pit 0.43 0.80 5.30 –1.45
dit 37.44 15.36 99.07 3.32
sit 25.09 81.53 2,987.66 –95.99
git 21.55 48.59 925.26 –84.22
Notes: eit, pit, dit, sit, and git represent ROE, EPS, D/TA ratio, growth rates of operating sales, and total 
assets, respectively. The data are from Taiwan Economic Journal Data Bank and the sample contains 
146 electronic firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange from the first quarter of 1999 to the third 
quarter of 2004. All variables are in the form of panel data series.
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Table 2. Panel unit-root tests
 t-statistic
 LLC IPS
eit –17.61*** –17.50***
pit –17.46*** –18.06***
dit –7.84*** –8.83***
sit –11.80*** –17.29***
git  –11.66*** –11.32***
Notes: eit, pit, dit, sit, and git represent ROE, EPS, D/TA ratio, growth rates of operating sales, and total 
assets, respectively. LLC and IPS represent the Levin et al. (2002) and Im et al. (2003) panel unit-root 
techniques, respectively. *** , **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 
percent levels, respectively. The t-statistic critical value for LLC and IPS at 1 percent, 5 percent, and 
10 percent significance levels is (–1.65, –1.96, –2.58), respectively.
Table 3. Tests for threshold effects between the debt ratio and proxy variables 
for firm value 
    Critical values
 Threshold value   (10 percent,
Firm-value of γ	 	 	 5 percent,
variables (percent) F p-value 1 percent)
Single-threshold effect test
 EPS 28.70 9.31 0.57 (19.30, 22.96, 29.03)
 ROE 75.31 24.33 0.06* (20.92, 24.75, 23.81)
Double-threshold effect test
 EPS 12.37  28.70 6.07 0.85 (14.95, 16.46, 19.88)
 ROE 51.75  75.31 5.47 0.82 (16.92, 19.40, 29.17)
Triple-threshold effect test
 EPS 12.37  28.70  37.39 2.96 0.99 (12.23, 13.93, 18.20)
 ROE 37.39  51.75  75.31 3.95 0.89 (11.57, 13.85, 16.64)
Notes: F-statistic and p-value result from repeating bootstrap procedure 200 times for each of the 
three bootstrap tests. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
Table 4. Estimated coefficients for each proxy variable for firm value in single 
threshold model
   White
Firm value Coefficients  Estimated value standard error
EPS α[1 0.0059** 0.0027
 α[2 0.0010 0.0016
ROE α[1 –0.0193 0.0151
 α[2 –0.0817* 0.0430
Notes: There exists a single-threshold effect when ROE is selected as the proxy for firm value, and 
the estimated threshold value (γ) is found to be 75.31 percent. For EPS, γ is found to be 28.70 percent 
from Table 3. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, 
respectively.
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model are shown in Table 5. An ambiguous finding can be observed in Table 5 that the 
effect values in the three higher regimes of EPS estimation are positive, whereas the 
values of the two higher regimes are negative in the ROE estimation. However, if we look 
into the triple-threshold estimation in Table 3, the contradictory finding can be cleared 
up: The highest threshold value of EPS that proxies firm value equals the lowest value 
of ROE proxying the firm value (37.39 percent).
Regarding ROE as a proxy for firm value, the negative effects are contingent on the 
two upper regimes, when the debt ratio is higher than 51.75 percent. Positive effects are 
associated with the two lower regimes, where the debt ratio is lower than 51.75 percent. 
However, a significant positive effect appears only in the lowest regime, where the debt 
ratio is less than 37.39 percent.
The estimated value of the coefficient in the lowest regime, α[1, is 0.0316, which im-
plies that when the debt ratio increases by 1 percent, ROE increases by 0.0316 percent. 
In the second-lowest regime, where the debt ratio is above 37.39 percent but below 51.75 
percent, the estimated value of the coefficient α[2 is still positive but insignificant, and 
the impact value decreases to 0.0116. The negative effects are found in the two upper 
regimes and are insignificant. Based on the estimated value of α[3 = –0.0081 and α[4 = 
–0.0704, the negative effects on firm value increase gradually along with the increase in 
the debt ratio. This ROE triple-threshold result confirms that the appropriate debt ratio 
range should not exceed 51.57 percent.
We further look at the estimation when EPS proxies firm value. In the lowest regime, 
where the debt ratio is below 12.37 percent, the estimated value of coefficient α[1 is 
–0.0085. Nonetheless, when the debt ratio is above 12.37 percent but below 28.70 percent, 
the estimate of coefficient α[2 is positive and significant at the 5 percent level. The value 
of α[2 = 0.0075 implies that EPS increases by 0.0075 percent with a 1 percent increase in 
the debt ratio. Though the estimates of coefficients in the higher regimes are still positive 
(α[3 = 0.0031 and α[4 = 0.0011), they are insignificant, and the value decreases gradually 
with the decrease in debt ratio.
Overall, combined with the findings of both the ROE and EPS triple-threshold estima-
tions, we may conclude that, for listed electronic companies in Taiwan, the appropriate 
debt ratio range should not be above 51.57 percent or below 12.37 percent for the sake of 
Table 5. Estimated coefficients for each proxy variable for the firm value in 
triple-threshold model
   White
Firm value Coefficients  Estimated value standard error
EPS α[1 –0.0085 0.0089
 α[2 0.0075** 0.0037
 α[3  0.0031 0.0027
 α[4 0.0011 0.0019
ROE α[1 0.0316* 0.0173
 α[2  0.0116 0.0137
 α[3  –0.0081 0.0158
 α[4  –0.0704 0.0433
Notes: α[1, α[2, α[3, and α[4 represent coefficient estimate smaller and larger than threshold values γ1, γ2, 
and γ3, which are, respectively, 12.37 percent, 28.70 percent, and 37.39 percent for EPS and 37.39 
percent, 51.75 percent, and 75.31 percent for ROE. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 
percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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the negative influence of the debt usage on firm value. However, to ensure and enhance 
the firm’s value properly, the optimal range of debt ratio should be within 12.37 percent 
and 28.70 percent.6
The results infer that the increase of the debt ratio at low debt levels—between 12.37 
percent and 37.39 percent—can improve the operating performance of firms, and in 
turn increase firm value, which is consistent with Modigliani and Miller (1963). Costs 
of leverage and financial distress increase as the debt ratio increases gradually, which 
counteracts the positive effect of the debt ratio to operating performance. Our finding 
that α[4 < α[3 < α[2 in the EPS triple-threshold model is consistent with this view. The 
agency theory also explains this result. On one hand, a higher debt ratio means less free 
cash flow for managers to manipulate, which can reduce agency costs and increase a 
firm’s value. However, when the debt ratio is too high, the conflicts between creditors 
and shareholders increase agency costs, leading to financial distress and deterioration 
in the value of firms. Referring to the former result of the ROE single-threshold model, 
the estimated threshold value (γ) is found to be 75.31 percent; two coefficients are all 
negative, whereas only α[2 of the upper regime is statistically significant. This shows that 
incremental debt usage above 75.31 percent is detrimental to firm value, as the trade-off 
and agency theories suggest.
The two control variables considered in our paper, growth rates of operating sales 
and total assets, may also influence firm value. Table 6 shows that both the growth rates 
of operating sales and total assets significantly and positively influence firm value when 
EPS is selected as the proxy variable. Only growth rate of operating sales significantly 
influences firm value when ROE is selected as the proxy variable.
Conclusion
Capital structure decisions made by firms may have significant effects on the firms’ 
expected profitability or performance. This paper aims to find an optimal debt ratio for 
capital investment and investigates the effects of financial leverage on a firm’s value for 
listed electronic firms in Taiwan.
The evidence from our threshold effect estimation in testing for the optimal capital 
structure has shown that there exists only a single-threshold effect of debt ratio on firm 
value when ROE is selected to proxy firm value. The estimated threshold value separates 
our observations into two regimes; the coefficients of both regimes are negative and only 
the upper regime is significant. However, for further details, based on our combined find-
ings of ROE and EPS triple-threshold estimations, we find that the appropriate debt ratio 
Table 6. Estimation of coefficients of control variables in triple-threshold model
   White
Firm value Coefficients  Estimated value standard error
EPS q{1 0.0028*** 0.0004
 q{2 0.0013*** 0.0005
ROE q{1 0.0234*** 0.0023
 q{2 0.0038 0.0025
Notes: q{1 and q{2 represent the estimated coefficients of growth rates on operating sales and total 
assets, respectively. ***, **, and * represent significance at the 1 percent, 5 percent, and 10 percent 
levels, respectively.
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range for listed electronic firms in Taiwan should not be over 51.57 percent or below 12.37 
percent. To ensure and enhance a firm’s value, the optimal range of debt ratio should be 
within 12.37 percent and 28.70 percent. Our finding is consistent with the trade-off theory 
that when the debt ratio is too high, conflicts between creditors and shareholders increase 
agency costs, leading to financial distress and sharply deteriorating firm value. The tax 
shield is offset by the incremental costs through debt financing, which counteracts the 
positive effect of the debt ratio on operating performance.
Different industries view the trade-off between debt and equity differently. Most 
listed electronic firms in Taiwan are highly profitable and generate more internal cash 
flows. According to our empirical results, an increase of debt ratio at low debt levels can 
improve the operating performance of listed electronic firms, which in turn increases 
their firm values. Moreover, the growth rate of operating sales significantly affects firm 
value, whereas the growth rate of total assets is shown to have no significant effect on 
firm value. This implies that expanding assets does not necessarily increase firm value. 
This paper recommends that companies investigate the contingent cash flows for their 
capital structure strategies and financial managers use leverage wisely to maximize firm 
values and shareholders’ welfare.
Notes 
1. Whiting (1991) adopted statistical data from the United States as an example.
2. Spurious regression is argued in Granger and Newbold (1974), as the estimation of the 
relationship among nonstationary series easily reaches a higher R2 and t-statistics.
3. LLC is a modified version of the LL (Levin and Lin 1992; 1993) panel unit-root 
technique.
4. For a detailed illustration, see the Appendix and Hansen (1999).
5. Note that LR1(γ1) is testing for H0: γ = γ0, and F1 is testing H0: α = α2.
6. This finding is consistent with the former result of the EPS single-threshold model (see Table 
4), which shows that the coefficient α[1, in the lower regime with debt ratio below 28.70 percent, 
is positive and significant (α[1 = 0.0059).
7. Note that the statistic (16) is testing a different hypothesis from the statistic (15) introduced 
in the previous section. LR1(γ0) is testing H0 : γ = γ0, and F(γ) is testing H0 : α1 = α2.
8. See Hansen (1999), Appendix: Assumptions 1–8.
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Appendix
Threshold Model Construction
Assuming the optimal debt proportion appears to be relevant to corporate performance 
or value of electronic listed firms in Taiwan, this paper aims at finding whether exists a 
threshold effect and try to use threshold model to estimate this ratio, which may capture 
the relationship between financial leverage and the firm value as well as help financial 
managers make decisions.
Thus, we set up single threshold model as follows:
 
v
h d  d
h d  dit
i it it it it
i it it it it
=
+ ′ + + ≤
+ ′ + + >


µ θ α ε γ
µ θ α ε γ
1
2
if
if
 (A1)
 q = (q1, q2)′, hit = (sit, git)′,
where vit represents proxy variables for the firm value, which are eit: ROE, pit: EPS, dit, D/
TA ratio, which is also the threshold variable; γ, the specific estimated threshold value.
There are two “control variables” (hit) that may have influences on the firm value, 
which are sit: growth rate of operating sales, git: growth rate of total assets. Besides, µi, the 
fixed effect, represents the heterogeneity of companies under different operating condi-
tions. The errors εit is assumed to be independent and identically distributed with mean 
zero and finite variance σ2(εit ~ iid(0, σ2)); i represents different companies; t represents 
different periods.
Another threshold regression model of (A1) is to set
 vit = µi + q′hit + α1ditI(dit ≤ γ) + α2ditI(dit > γ) + εit, (A2)
where I(.) represents the indicator function.
vit = µi + q′hit + α′dit(γ) + εit can be written as
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v x
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it i it it
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γ
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≤( )
>( )


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


d I d
d I d
it it
it it
γ
γ
,
 
(A3)
where α = (α1, α2)′, b = (q′, α′)′, xit = (h′it, d′it(γ)).
The observations are divided into two “regimes” depending on whether the threshold 
variable dit is smaller or larger than the threshold value of γ. The regimes are distinguished 
by differing regression slopes, α1 and α2. We will use known vit and dit to estimate the 
parameters (γ, α, q, and σ2).
Estimation
Note that by taking averages of (A3) over the time index t, we can derive
 
v dit i it it= + ′ ( ) +µ β γ ε ,
 (A4)
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where 
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=
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∑
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,
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.
Taking the difference between (A3) and (A4) yields
 v*it = α′d*it(γ) + ε*it, (A5)
where v*it = vit – v\i, d*it(γ) = dit(γ) – d |i(γ), and ε*it = εit – ε\i.
Let
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denote the stacked data and errors for an individual, with one time period deleted. Then 
let the V*, D*(γ), and e* denote the data stacked over all individuals.
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Using this notation, (A5) is equivalent to 
 V*it = D*it(γ)α + e*it. (A6)
Equation (A6) represents the major estimation model of threshold effect. For any 
given threshold value of γ, the slope coefficient α can be estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS). That is, 
 
ˆ
.
* * * *α γ γ γ γ( ) = ( )′ ( )

 ( )
−
D D D V
1
 
(A7)
The vector of regression residuals is 
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ˆ ˆ
* * *e V Dγ γ α γ( ) = − ( ) ( )
 (A8)
and the sum of squared errors, SSE, is 
 
SSE e e V I D D D D1
1
γ γ γ γ γ γ γ( ) = ( )′ ( ) = − ( ) ( )′ ( )

 ( )
′

−
ˆ ˆ
* * * * * * *

V*.
 
(A9)
Hansen (1999) recommended estimation of γ by least squares. This is easier to achieve 
by minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors (A9). Hence, the least squares 
estimators of γ is 
 
ˆ argmin .γ γ= ( )
r
SSE1
 
(A10)
Once γ[ is obtained, the slope coefficient estimate is α[ = α[(γ[). The residual vector is e[* = 
e[*(γ[), and the estimator of residual variance is
 
ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ,
* *σ σ γ γ γ γ2 2 1
1
1
1
1
= ( ) =
−( )
′ ( ) ( ) =
−( ) ( )n T e e n T SSE
 
(A11)
where n indexes the number of sample, T indexed the periods of sample.
Testing for a Threshold
According to the “trade-off theory” of capital structure, when debt ratio increases, the 
interest tax shield increases; however, on the other side, leverage-related costs increase 
to offset the positive effect of debt ratio to the firm value. This paper hypothesizes that 
there exists a threshold effect between the D/TA ratio and firm value. Therefore, it is 
important to determine whether the threshold effect is statistically significant. The null 
hypothesis and alternative hypothesis can be represented as follows:
 
H
H
0 1 2
1 1 2
:
:
.
α α
α α
=
≠



When the null hypothesis holds, the coefficient α1 = α2, the threshold effect does not 
exist. When the alternative hypothesis holds, the coefficient α1 ≠	α2, the threshold effect 
exists between the D/TA ratio and firm value.
Under the null hypothesis of no threshold, the model is 
 vit = µi + q′hit + α′dit(γ) + εit. (A12)
After the fixed-effect transformation is made, we have
 V*it = α′1H*it + e*it. (A13)
The regression parameter is estimated by OLS, yielding estimate α]1, residuals e]* and 
sum of squared errors SSE0 = e]*/e]*.
Hansen (1999) suggested that we use the F-test approach to test the existence of 
threshold effect, and use the sup-Wald statistic to test the null hypothesis. 
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 F = sup F(γ) (A14)
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ˆ /
ˆ /
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ˆ
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(A15)
Asymptotic Distribution of Threshold Estimate
Hansen (1999) showed that when there is a threshold effect α1 ≠ α2, γ[ is consistent for 
γ0, and that the asymptotic distribution is highly nonstandard. Hansen (1999) argued that 
the best way to form confidence intervals for γ is to form the “no-rejection region” using 
the likelihood ratio statistic for tests on γ. To test the hypothesis 
 
H 
H 
0 0
1 0  
: 
: 
γ γ  
γ γ  
= 
≠ 
 
 
 
,
we construct the testing model: 
 
LR
SSE SSE
1
1 1
2γ
γ γ
σ
( ) = ( )
− ( )ˆ
ˆ
.
 
(A16)
Hansen (1999) pointed out that when LR1(γ0) is too large and the p-value exceeds the 
confidence interval, the null hypothesis is rejected.7 Besides, Hansen (1999) indicated 
that under some specific assumptions8 and H0 : γ = γ0,
 LR1(γ) = dζ, (A17)
as n →	∞, where ζ is a random variable with distribution function
 P(ζ	≤ x) = (1 – exp(–x/2))2. (A18)
The asymptotic p-value can be estimated under the likelihood ratio. According to the 
proof of Hansen (1999), the distribution function (A18) has the inverse 
 
c α α( ) = − − −( )2 1 1log
 
(A19) 
from which it is easy to calculate critical values. For a given asymptotic level α, the null 
hypothesis γ = γ0 rejects if LR1(γ) exceeds c(α).
Multiple Thresholds Model
If double thresholds exist, the model is modified as
 
v
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h d  dit
i it it it it
i it it it it=
+ ′ + + ≤
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µ θ α ε γ
µ θ α ε γ
1 1
2 1
if
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+ ′ + + ≤
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

γ
µ θ α ε γ
2
3 2i it it it ith d  dif .
 
(A20)
where threshold value γ1 < γ2. This can be extended to multiple thresholds model (γ1, γ2, 
γ3, ..., γn).
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